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ABSTRACT
We estimate the causal effect of nurse turnover on mortality and the quality of nursing
home care with a fixed effect instrumental variable estimation that uses the unemployment rate
as an instrument for nursing turnover. We find that ignoring endogeneity leads to a systematic
underestimation of the effect of nursing turnover on mortality and quality of care in a sample of
California nursing homes. Specifically, 10 percentage point increase in nurse turnover results in
a facility receiving 2.2 additional deficiencies per annual regulatory survey, reflecting a 19.3
percent increase. Not accounting for endogeneity of turnover leads to results that suggest only a
1 percent increase in deficiencies. We also find suggestive evidence that turnover results in lower
quality in other dimensions and may increase mortality. An implication of our mortality results is
that turnover may be a mechanism for the procyclicality of mortality rates.
JEL Classification Codes: I11, J21, E24
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New employees can be costly, as new hires need to be trained to become familiar with
the procedures and operations of a firm. Thus, excessive employee turnover can be a source of
concern for a firm. The health care industry is one profession in which turnover is potentially an
important determinant of firm output, but it has received little attention from economists.
Turnover in health facilities reduces the effectiveness and productivity of delivering care, and
may also increase operating cost (Squillace et al. 2008). In addition, when nurses are assigned to
the same patients, they can form personal bonds, which may lead to better health outcomes
(Thomas et al. 2013). For this reason, policymakers and trade associations have made efforts to
identify and address turnover, particularly in the nursing home industry. For example, in 2012,
the American Health Care Association (2012) announced a three year goal to reduce staff
turnover in nursing homes by 15 percent. And in the state of Ohio, the state legislature passed the
Long-Term Care Quality Initiative, which pays nursing homes higher Medicaid reimbursement
rates for meeting certain quality goals, including reducing staff turnover. 1
While there are many calls and efforts made to improve healthcare worker turnover, it is
not fully understood if turnover directly impacts quality. Most research on turnover in the health
care sector has focused on the determinants of staff retention (Elliott et al. 2009; Frijters, Shields,
and Price 2007) or cites turnover as a potential explanation for a result, but it does not directly
examine turnover. For example, Propper and Van Reenan (2010) suggest that turnover may be a
reason for poor hospital quality. And more recently, turnover of staff in nursing homes has been
suggested as a mechanism for why mortality rates are procyclical. Specifically, Miller et al.
(2009) find that most of the improvement in health during recessions occur among those older

1

See Ohio Senate Bill Number 264, available at
http://archives.legislature.state.oh.us/bills.cfm?ID=129_SB_264. (accessed May 19, 2015), and the Staff Retention
section of Ohio’s Department of Aging Nursing Home Quality Incentive website, available at
https://aging.ohio.gov/ltcquality/nfs/qualityincentives.aspx (accessed May 19, 2015).
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than 85, with much of the variation coming from the elderly in nursing homes (Stevens et al.
2015). While not directly explored, the results from these two papers suggests that recessions
lead to poor job prospects for low-skilled direct care workers in nursing homes, which then
results in lower turnover rates. These lower turnover rates may translate into better quality and
mortality outcomes for nursing home residents.
While there are a number of studies outside the economics literature that have examined
whether staff turnover in nursing homes is associated with quality of care, most of these studies
report results that are not statistically significant but suggest an association between turnover and
health outcomes (see Castle and Anderson 2011; Castle and Engberg, 2005; Castle, Enberg, and
Men 2007; Lerner et al. 2014; Thomas et al. 2013). More importantly, the existing literature does
“not convincingly establish causality running from turnover to outcomes” (Stevens et al. 2015, p.
301). The methods employed in these studies are generally not designed to find causal
relationships, as many studies use only one year of data, use data from self-collected surveys
with low response rates, econometrically dichotomize turnover and quality outcomes, and/or
ignore unobserved heterogeneity. Of greatest concern is unobserved heterogeneity. Failing to
account for unobserved factors that influence quality and are correlated with turnover can result
in biased estimates of the effect of turnover on quality. To illustrate, nursing homes with poor
quality of care may have bad management or be poor places to work, which are variables that are
unobserved to the researcher and can be correlated with turnover, leading to omitted variable
bias. A few studies have used multiple years of data and employed fixed effects to handle timeinvariant omitted variable bias (Castle and Anderson 2011; Thomas et al. 2013), but the current
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literature that examines quality outcomes has ignored the endogeneity of turnover that may arise
due to simultaneity or time-varying omitted variable bias. 2
This paper directly assesses whether employee turnover in nursing homes impact patient
quality and mortality after accounting for the endogeneity of turnover. We utilize administrative
data for all nursing homes in California. We chose California because it had available
information on turnover for various types of nursing home staffing, and it has a large nursing
home industry, with about 8 percent of all nursing home facilities in the United States. We
examine from the period 2005 to 2011, during which California’s economy saw significant
growth and contraction. We use this variation in the economy’s strength over time and
geographically across the state as our exclusion restriction in an instrumental variables (IV)
approach. Specifically, the exclusion restriction is the unemployment rate in the nursing home’s
county. Identification relies on the assumption that changes in county unemployment rates affect
quality of care only through turnover. As Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) note, when the
unemployment rate is high, the threat of firing improves the quality through lower turnover.
Because many nursing home residents are on Medicaid or are expected to remain in a nursing
home for the rest of their lives, their personal health and hence quality of care is unlikely to be
impacted by the state of the local economy once other factors are accounted for in the model. 3
Using panel data constructed by merging data from the Online Survey Certification and
Reporting System (OSCAR), Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD)
in California, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the Area Health Resource File, we find
that ignoring endogeneity leads to a systematic underestimation of the effect of nursing turnover
2

One paper outside of the economics literature used IVs to examine how turnover impacts nurse staffing
levels (Kash et al. 2006). The paper used training expense ratio, benefits expense ratio, professional staff ratio and
contracted staff ratio as instruments. These ratios are likely to impact turnover but may also influence staffing levels,
potentially undermining these ratios as valid instruments.
3
We test this formally in the section titled “Exclusion Restriction Variable.”
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on the quality of care and mortality. We find that a 10 percentage point increase in nursing
turnover leads to an additional 2.2 deficiency citations to a nursing home per annual regulatory
survey. This represents a 19.3 percent increase in deficiency citations. Not accounting for
endogeneity leads to results that suggest that nurse turnover leads to a facility receiving 0.12
more deficiency citations, or a 1 percent increase in citations. For most of our other quality
measures, we find that nursing turnover leads to worse quality of care, though this effect is not
statistically significant at conventional levels in some specifications. We also find suggestive
evidence that as turnover increases, a greater percentage of discharged nursing home residents
are discharged because of patient death.
This paper contributes to our understanding of the relationship between turnover and
outcomes. First, to the best of our knowledge the existing literature on the impact of turnover on
outcomes in nursing homes is noncausal. While some studies use panel data with fixed effects to
account for any unobserved heterogeneity, fixed effects cannot handle omitted time-invariant
factors. The changing policies and advocate efforts to improve the quality of nursing homes,
along with personal hiring/firing decisions that align with nursing home quality, make turnover
endogenous even though fixed effects are included in a model. By using fixed effect panel IV
regression, endogeneity bias from a number of factors is accounted for in our regressions.
Second, this paper expands the existing literature on the business cycle and health (Ruhm 2000).
With recent work (Stevens et al. 2015) finding that elderly mortality in nursing homes are
driving the procyclical nature of mortality, nurse turnover may be a leading causal factor driving
this result. And finally, the nursing home industry is large, with revenues equivalent to nearly 2
percent of GDP, and much of the turnover is among lower-skilled workers. Therefore,
understanding turnover in this industry may provide insight into other industries.

4

CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF TURNOVER AND NURSING HOME QUALITY
Prior research outside of the health care sector has found that high employee turnover can
lead to lower productivity, diminished profits, and poor customer service (Eckardt, Skaggs, and
Youndt e2014; Siebert and Zubanov 2009; Ton and Huckman 2008). One argument for these
results is that a lack of room for promotion or higher wages from outside options may encourage
workers with desirable traits to seek outside employment (Mas 2006; Munasinghe 2006). When
motivated workers and those with desirable traits leave, the quality of employees who remain
employed is lower. In contrast, firing workers may improve outcomes by enhancing the average
traits of employees that are retained (Jovanovic 1979; Weiss 1980). This implies that turnover of
employees can be a positive or negative for outcomes depending on the economics of the
particular industry.
In the case of the nursing home industry, the primary caregivers and those most
responsible for resident outcomes are nurses and nurse aides, which are collectively referred to
as nurses. These nurses come in three types based on the level of education, training, and
licensure: 1) registered nurses (RNs), 2) licensed practical nurses (LPNs), and 3) certified nurse
aides (CNAs). RNs and LPNs are considered licensed nurses because they have some
postsecondary education and are required to pass licensing exams. Licensed nurses coordinate
care, administer medicines and treatment ordered by physicians, and ensure professional
oversight of care directly provided to residents. In contrast to licensed nurses, CNAs provide the
majority of direct care to residents. Federal standards only require CNAs to have at least 75
hours of training, which includes 35 hours of classroom instruction and 50 hours of clinical
training.

5

The economics of employment in nursing homes lend the industry to experience high
turnover, over 50 percent annually, and in some facilities exceed 100 percent (Banaszak-Holl
and Hines 1996). Broken down by type of nurse, annualized turnover rates for RNs, LPNs, and
CNAs are estimated to be as high as 56, 51, and 75 percent, respectively (Donoghue 2009). One
of the key drivers of turnover is that wages at nursing homes tend to be lower than in other health
care settings, and often the job is not considered as “glamorous” as those in other health care
industries, such as working in hospitals. For example, the hourly mean wage for an RN in a
nursing home in 2013 was $29.81 compared to $33.94 for similar work in hospital. In fact, RN
wages in nursing homes were the lowest wage among the five settings where the Bureau of
Labor and Statistics (BLS) measured RN wages. 4 This drives licensed nurses to look for
employment in other health care settings. For CNAs, who are often considered unskilled or lowskilled workers, the average wage at nursing homes ($12.01 on average in 2013) is similar to
employment in similar skill-level jobs in retail, tourism, or other growing industries (Grabowski
et al. 2011). Additionally, these other jobs do not have the same mental cost of caring for
individuals who are physically dependent or have severe cognitive impairment.
We expect nurse turnover to be countercyclical, as poor economic environments make it
harder for existing employees to find jobs in other industries. This implies that economic
conditions may indirectly impact nursing home quality and mortality outcomes through turnover
for a number of reasons. First, when the economy is strong it may be harder to fill each
additional vacancy. This implies that for each subsequent nurse hired, the nursing home may
need to look deeper into their applicant pool and may be required to hire individuals that have
less desirable traits (e.g., less reliable, less caring, less experienced). Second, nurse staffing
4

Based on May 2013 BLS data for occupation 29-1141 – registered nurses, mean hourly wages are as
follows: nursing homes, $29.81; physician offices, $30.22; home health care services, $32.17; general medical and
surgical hospitals, $33.94; and outpatient care centers, $35.62.
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levels are known to be associated with higher nursing home quality (Cohen and Spector 1995;
Lin 2014), and lower turnover can lead to more consistent staffing levels. Third, when turnover
rates are lower, each nurse has more experience in knowing how to provide highquality, meet
regulatory standards, and build stronger personal relationships with residents (Thomas et al.
2013). Such familiarity might decrease the likelihood of using less evasive care practices, such as
catheters or physical restraints.
Overall, these mechanisms suggest that reducing turnover should result in improved
health outcomes, and that higher unemployment rates would impact outcomes through reductions
in nurse turnover. While a few studies have found that higher nurse turnover can lead to worse
quality, the vast majority of studies do not find a statistically significant relationship (Castle and
Anderson 2011; Castle and Engberg 2005; Castle et al. 2007; Lerner et al. 2011; Thomas et al.
2013). The lack of using causal identification by the current literature may explain why most
studies find statistically insignificant effects. Our contribution to the literature is to use causal
identification techniques, specifically to use the local unemployment rate as an instrument to
determine how turnover impacts nursing home outcomes.

DATA AND METHOD
Data Sources and Sample Selection
This study uses data from four sources for nursing homes in the state of California. The
first is utilization and financial information on long-term care facilities obtained from the
California OSHPD. On an annual basis, OSPHD collects information on various measures such
as patient census, patient demographics, major capital expenditures, wages and salaries, casemix, and most importantly for this study labor turnover. We merge OSHPD data with data from
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the OSCAR data set. OSCAR, maintained by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS), is a uniform database of yearly regulatory reviews of all nursing homes that receive
payments from Medicare or Medicaid. These reviews are completed by a government survey
team that assesses nursing home quality and validates all the data reported in OSCAR. Reviews
of nursing homes are completed every 9–15 months with an average of 12 months between
reviews. OSCAR contains data on the number of regulatory deficiencies each nursing home
receives, staffing levels, case-mix, and multiple measures of quality. Finally, these two data
sources are supplemented with information about the annual county unemployment level and
demographic information from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Area Health Resource File,
respectively.
The sample used in this analysis is free-standing nursing homes in the state of California
from 2005 through 2011. The resulting sample consists of 5,992 facility-year observations of 980
unique nursing homes. 5 We examined the state of California because OSHPD data contain
multiple measures of nursing and employee turnover, the key variable in this analysis. We
selected the study period 2005—2011 for three reasons. First, the study period includes
economic growth and contraction associated with the Great Recession. This provides temporal
and regional variation in the economic growth that aids in the identification of the effect of
turnover in nursing homes. Second, California implemented a minimum nurse staffing ratio in
hospitals that became effective in January 2004. Many hospitals were required to increase nurse
staffing levels (Cook et al. 2012), potentially impacting turnover in nursing homes. By starting

5

While the vast majority of nursing homes have data for all years, some nursing homes may only have
partial data because they entered or exited the market. To determine if entry or exit is a concern, we estimated
models for nursing homes that appear in the sample each year. Our results are not overly sensitive to entry or exit
and are discussed in the “Robustness Tests” section.
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the study in 2005, any impact of this change would have worked its way through the system. 6
Finally, the Medi-Cal Long Term Care Reimbursement Act of 2004 (Act AB1629) increased
reimbursement to nursing homes for the state’s Medicaid program starting in 2005 (California
Assembly Bill 1629). Since all nursing homes are affected by this legislation, using data starting
in 2005 minimizes the potential impact that the changes in reimbursement might have on
turnover and quality of care by examining a study period that traverses 2005. 7
Key Dependent and Explanatory Variables
The OSHPD provides data on the key explanatory variable of interest, staff turnover.
Staff turnover is available for three types of employees: 1) all employees; 2) all nursing staff
(RNs, LPNs, and CNAs); and 3) CNAs. While historically most turnover in nursing homes is
among CNAs, our main focus is on turnover rates for all nurses as the three available turnover
rates are highly correlated as shown in Figure 1. 8 Turnover rates are measured annually and are
defined as the number of times an employee is replaced in a year divided by the average number
of people employed during the year. All turnover rates are measured as percentages with 0
percent indicating no turnover during the year and 100 percent indicating the average employee
was replaced once during the year. The average annual turnover rate regardless of the measure
used is approximately 50 percent, though some facilities report zero turnover in some years and
others have turnover rates of over 200 percent (See Table 1).
The dependent variables are a series of quality measures and two mortality measures.
Information on quality is obtained from OSCAR, which is considered one of the most reliable

6

We also examined slightly later starting years and found little difference in our results.
We also conducted a robustness check that accounts for this change in reimbursement. Results are
qualitatively identical to our main results and are discussed in the “Robustness Tests” section with other robustness
checks.
8
The correlation between the three measures of turnover ranges from 0.80 to 0.89. In the robustness check
section, we present results for the other turnover measures.
7
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sources of quality of care in nursing homes and has been used in studies on the nursing home
industry in California (Harrington et al. 2000; Matsudaira 2014). The first measure utilized is the
number of regulatory deficiencies a facility received during their federal regulatory inspection.
We also follow the research of Harrington et al. (2000) by classifying each deficiency into three
mutually exclusive categories: quality of care, quality of life, and other deficiencies. 9 As per the
State Operations Manual, surveyors examine whether the facility is meeting each of over 180
federal regulatory standards. 10 If the facility is found to fail to meet a standard, the inspection
team will issue a deficiency indicating that a quality problem exists. For example, under
regulation §483.13, residents have the right to be free from physical restraints unless medically
necessary. If a nursing home uses physical restraints for discipline or convenience, then the
nursing home would receive a deficiency for improper physical restraint use. For our study
period, the average nursing home received 11.5 deficiencies, though the range is 0–51 (See Table
1).
The second and third set of quality measures are resident outcomes and care practices
utilized by the nursing home. The two resident outcome measures we examine are the percentage
of residents with bedsores and the percentage of residents with contractures. Bedsores are an
injury to the skin and tissue caused by lack of blood supply induced by constant pressure. A
contracture is a shortening of the soft tissue caused by lack of movement of a joint. These two
measures are good measures of quality of care because both conditions are preventable and
treatable (Bowblis, Meng, and Hyer 2013; Grabowski 2001). Two measures of care practices are
9

Quality of care included 72 specific items in the following federal survey categories: resident assessment,
quality of care, nursing services, dietary services, physician services, rehabilitative services, dental services,
pharmacy services, and infection control. The quality of life category included 77 specific items on resident’s rights;
admission, transfer, and discharge rights (including resident rights); resident behavior and facility practices (includes
resident rights); quality of life; and physical environment. Other deficiencies included 30 specific items on
administration, lab services and other activities.
10
The State Operations Manual is available at: http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/som107ap_pp_guidelines_ltcf.pdf.
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also utilized: the percentage of residents with catheters and percentage physically restrained.
Care practices are associated with quality of life and may impact the physical and emotional
health of residents (Bowblis and Lucas 2012). For instance, the insertion of catheters places the
resident at greater risk for urinary tract infection (Cawley, Grabowski, and Hirth 2006; Park and
Stearns 2009). Physical restraints, on the other hand, may increase the risk of bedsores,
depression, mental and physical deterioration, and mortality (Park and Stearns 2009; Zinn 1993).
For both resident outcomes and care practice quality measures, higher values imply lower
quality. Additionally, some residents may have had the underlying condition or been ordered to
have a care practice prior to admission. In order to account for preadmission case mix, the
percentage of residents with each condition is adjusted for residents that had the condition prior
to admission. The measures utilized therefore reflect the percentage of residents that acquired the
condition at the facility. Even after adjusting for acquiring the condition at the facility, the
variation in quality in these measures is significant (Table 1). For example, the average
observation has 2.5 percent of residents with a facility-acquired bedsore though the range is 0–78
percent. Similar patterns are found for contractures, catheters, and physical restraints.
The final dependent variables we examine are measures of mortality. The OSHPD data
report the annual number of discharges that are due to death. We calculate the proportion of
discharges that are due to death by dividing discharges due to death by total discharges. For
simplicity we refer to this measure as the discharge death rate. As an alternative measure, we
also calculate the proportion of residents who die as a percentage of year-end census, which we
refer to as the census death rate. The census death rate is not perfect because we do not have the
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exact number of residents that were in the nursing home throughout the year, but it proxies for
death rate. 11 We follow the literature by using logged death rate measures (Stevens et al. 2015).
Empirical Strategy
To identify the impact of turnover on mortality and quality of nursing home care, we
specify the following linear panel regression model
(1)

𝑄𝑗𝑐𝑡 = 𝑇𝑗𝑐𝑡 𝜃 + 𝑋𝑗𝑐𝑡 𝛽 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡2 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗𝑐𝑡

where 𝑄𝑗𝑐𝑡 is a measure of quality or mortality for nursing home j in county c, in year t, and 𝑇𝑗𝑐𝑡
is a measure of turnover. The parameter 𝜃 captures the effect of turnover on quality. The vector
𝑋𝑗𝑐𝑡 accounts for patient, facility, and market characteristics that may influence nursing home
quality. To account for variation in quality over time a time trend is also included (𝜏𝑡 ) and is

specified to be a quadratic. Finally, to account for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, 𝛿𝑗 is

treated as a nursing home fixed effect.

An issue with estimating Equation (1) is that turnover is likely to be correlated with
unobserved time-varying factors, and/or nursing home quality and turnover are simultaneously
determined. Both of these lead to the endogeneity of turnover, and this requires Equation (1) to
be estimated using IVs. IV methods require the existence of an exclusion restriction, commonly
referred to as an instrument that explains the endogenous variable but is orthogonal to the
dependent variable of interest. In this context, an exclusion restriction is a variable that explains
turnover but does not explain quality or mortality independent of turnover. The exclusion
restriction utilized is the annual county unemployment rate. County unemployment varies
geographically across California and temporally with growth in the economy leading up to the

11

Furthermore, we also define mortality as the proportion of residents who died per patient day and come
to the same general conclusions.
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Great Recession and the negative shock to the economy caused by the housing market crash.
When IV is utilized, the following first-stage model is estimated in order to obtain predicted
values of turnover for each nursing home
(2)

𝑇𝑗𝑐𝑡 = 𝑈𝑐𝑡 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑗𝑐𝑡 𝜑 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡2 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗𝑐𝑡

where 𝑈𝑐𝑡 is the annual county unemployment rate and all other variables have the same
interpretation as Equation (1).

Most prior studies on nursing home turnover and quality are cross-sectional in nature or
use only fixed effects (FE). In order to compare the bias that may arise from only using ordinary
least squares (OLS) or ignoring the endogeneity of turnover, we report multiple specifications of
the above equations. First, we estimate Equation (1) using three different statistical methods:
pooled OLS, panel FE, and panel FE with IV. Our preferred specification is the panel FE with
IV. Second, for each of these three methods, we also report results using various levels of
controls. In one set of specifications, we control for no additional covariates (𝑋𝑗𝑐𝑡 or 𝜏𝑡 ). In the
second set of specifications, additional controls are included but time trends are omitted. The

purpose of reporting these two model specifications is to show that including additional controls
does not significantly impact the effect of turnover on quality. 12 The third specification includes
all controls and includes a quadratic time trend. The time trends are highly correlated with the
exclusion restriction and eliminate much of the yearly variation in the exclusion restriction,
making Equation (1) sensitive to how time trends are defined. Specifically, the effect size for the
turnover variable in Equation (1) is consistent, but the statistical significance is sometimes
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Some control variables may be endogenous and therefore by showing the results are not sensitive to
including or excluding control variables, we show that any potential endogeneity of these other variables does not
impact the results on turnover.
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sensitive to the definition. Therefore, the main regression results include a common quadratic
time trend, though alternative definitions are discussed further in the robustness section. 13
The panel FE with IV regressions with all controls and time trends are considered the
baseline regressions because they account for endogeneity and unobserved time-invariant
heterogeneity. By comparing this baseline regression to the pooled OLS and the panel FE
regressions, we are able to determine how much bias exists in estimating turnover models that
ignore these issues. We expect OLS to be biased toward underestimating the effect of turnover
on quality. While higher unemployment rates should reduce nursing home turnover and improve
quality, unemployed workers may have more time to provide home care to their aging parents.
This would reduce demand for nursing home care among the elderly that are healthier, leading a
more dependent case-mix of resident in the nursing home. While we control for case mix,
unobservable changes in the mix of patients entering a nursing home may lead to worse quality,
holding all other factors constant. This implies that OLS would underreport the negative impact
of turnover on quality. 14
Exclusion Restriction Variable
The exclusion restriction utilized in this study is the county unemployment rate. The vast
majority of nursing home workers are CNAs or other workers of similar skill levels, such has
housekeeping and food service staff. The labor market for these types of workers is characterized
by great fluidity and wages close to the minimum wage (Munroe 1990). This implies that most
nursing home workers earn wages that are about the same as the wages of similar skill-level
13

An alternative model specification that was utilized that does not require a time trend to be defined is to
utilize a long-differenced model. This included taking the first difference of the data for years 2005 and 2011, and
then estimating a cross-sectional regression. The coefficient estimates for the long-differenced model were
consistent with those reported in the paper.
14
We examine the effect of turnover and unemployment rates on nursing home admissions and discharges,
as well as resident case mix, and find that they did not affect these outcomes. We provide a thorough discussion of
this in the next section.
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workers in retail, hotels, or fast-food chains. 15 The intuition underlying the strength of the
instrument is that weak labor markets would reduce nursing home turnover, as there are fewer
non–health care employment opportunities for most nursing home workers.
In terms of orthogonality, the nursing home industry is only a small sector of any
county’s overall economy—any shock to a county’s unemployment is uncorrelated with nursing
home worker productivity that may influence quality. Furthermore, while we do not expect
county unemployment rate to directly lead to unobservable changes in residents that are in or are
admitted to nursing homes, there is a possibility that county unemployment is related to
outcomes on the margin. As mentioned above, during poor macroeconomic conditions,
unemployed workers may have more time to provide home care to their aging parents or
relatives. The availability of home care could either hasten or delay entry for individuals who
may marginally consider entering a nursing home, reducing demand for nursing home care
among the elderly that are slightly healthier. This could affect quality of care and mortality by
altering the characteristics of residents in a nursing home.
To rule out these possible channels we analyze the effect of county unemployment rate
on total admissions, total discharges, and observable patient characteristics—that is, physical
acuity level of patients, percent of residents with dementia, psychiatric illness, and
developmental disability. We posit two models, the first is a simple correlation (OLS with no
controls) and the second is the correlation after controlling for nursing home fixed effects and
time trends. Our preferred specification is the second model since we use panel data in our
analysis.

15

Citing a 1996 Institute of Medicine report, Grabowski et al. (2011) note that the wage rates between
CNAs are comparable to levels offered at retail and fast food establishments: there were “reports of CNAs leaving
health care for retail jobs when a Kmart opened or to waitress or clean in locations where the tourist industry was
growing” (p. 263).
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The results of this exercise are reported in Appendix Table 1. In both models, we find
that county unemployment rate has no direct effect on admissions, discharges, and percent of
residents with dementia or developmental disability. Psychiatric illness is correlated with
unemployment rates, but the effect disappears when nursing home fixed effects and time trends
are included. We also find that county unemployment is negatively correlated with physical
acuity, but once fixed effects and time trends are included the correlation is positive. 16 We
conclude from our exercise that county unemployment rate has no direct effect on the volume or
case mix of nursing home residents. This result is not surprising since most residents in nursing
homes are the oldest of the elderly population, and the decision to enter a nursing home is
usually determined by physical and/or psychological functioning, which is independent of county
unemployment rate. While the business cycle may be correlated with the financial standing of
some nursing home residents, making private-pay residents spend down to Medicaid faster, these
time-varying factors are observable and controlled for in the regression analysis. Therefore,
county unemployment rate has economic validity as an exclusion restriction.
Other Control Variables
Included in some model specifications and captured in the vector 𝑋𝑗𝑐𝑡 are resident,

facility, and market control variables that may influence quality. These can broadly be broken
into resident demographics, facility structure, operational characteristics, resident case mix,
staffing levels, and market characteristics. Summary statistics for all of these variables are
reported in Table 1.
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While physical acuity is correlated with unemployment, the results are sensitive to the controls included
in the model and are not stable. Additionally, the positive correlation found when fixed effects and time trends are
included suggest that higher unemployment is associated with worse patient case-mix. This should cause quality to
be worse and would bias our results towards finding no effect.
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Residential demographics capture the percentage of residents that report a nonwhite or
unknown race and the percentage of residents that report Hispanic ethnicity. Facility structure is
captured by ownership, facility size, membership in a multifacility organization, and the
presence of special care units. Ownership of a facility can be by a for-profit, not-for-profit, or
government organization. Each of these ownership types have different objectives and may result
in different levels of investment in quality (Grabowski et al. 2013). Larger facilities may have
economies of scale in quality while facilities that are part of large chains may institute
standardized care processes and have greater resources that could be shared across facilities.
Additional resources and specialized trained staff are often associated with special care units.
Operational characteristics dictate the amount of financial resources a facility has
available to devote to improving quality. For example, Medicaid reimbursement rates are
generally low and nursing homes that have greater reliance on Medicaid residents tend to have
lower quality (Gertler 1992). To capture how payer-mix can influence quality, we include the
percentage of resident days paid for by Medicare, Medicaid, and self-pay with a reference group
of private pay. We also control for the percentage of residents who are in a managed care plan.
These resources only materialize if a bed is occupied; therefore, occupancy rates are included as
a control.
While operational characteristics indicate resources available, resident case mix dictates
the amount of resources a facility needs. Most facilities provide postacute care and long-term
care, which require different resources. To capture the relative importance of postacute care in
each facility we include the percentage of discharges that occurred in less than one month.
Additionally, more complex case-mix, as measured by higher physical acuity levels, and more
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residents with dementia, psychiatric illnesses or developmental disability, impacts the level of
quality a nursing home can achieve. 17
Nurse staffing is the primary input in the production of nursing home services, and higher
levels of staffing are thought to improve quality (Bowblis 2011; Lin 2014; Park and Stearns
2009). Nurse staffing consists of three types: RNs, LPNs, and CNAs. For each type of nurse, we
construct measures of staffing level in terms of hours per resident day (HPRD). We also
construct a measure of total nurse staff HPRD, which is the sum of HPRD for all three nurse
types. Due to measurement error from self-reporting, following Bowblis (2011) we identify
observations that have zero staffing or are three standard deviations above the mean. For these
identified observations, reported staffing levels are changed to zero and we include in the
regression an indicator variable for potentially erroneous staffing levels being reported.
The final set of controls includes market-level characteristics that may influence turnover
or nursing home quality. Following the nursing home literature, the county is used as a proxy for
the geographic market (Cawley, Grabowski, and Hirth 2006). 18 Market-level variables used in
this study include market concentration as measured by a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index using
number of beds to measure market share, the log of population over the age of 65, and the log of
per capita income.
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The average physical acuity level of the facility is measured by the acuindex (Cowles 2002), which
captures the level of need based on activities of daily living and special treatments received by residents. Higher
values imply greater acuity levels.
18
For antitrust and merger analysis purposes, nursing home geographic markets may be better defined
using alternative metrics, such as patient flows. In this study, market-level characteristics are utilized as control
variables, and using alternative definitions does not significantly influence the impact of turnover on quality.
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RESULTS
First-Stage Results
An exclusion restriction that is weakly correlated with the endogenous variable can do
more harm than good by increasing the bias relative to treating the endogenous variable as
exogenous (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995). Visual evidence from the Figure 1 shows that all
three turnover measures are highly correlated with the employment rate (100 − unemployment
rate), with correlations of at least 0.93. 19 While this suggests a strong correlation between
unemployment and turnover, statistical tests can determine if an exclusion restriction is too
weakly correlated to be considered valid. Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest estimating the firststage regression (Equation [2]) and performing an F-test on the exclusion restrictions to
determine if they are jointly equal to zero. Their rough guideline is that an F-statistic below 10
would imply that the correlation is too weak for the exclusion to be considered valid. A second
method is to estimate a Cragg-Donaldson statistic on the exclusion restrictions in the first stage
and compare the test to the critical values obtained by Stock and Yogo (2005). An exclusion
restriction is weak if the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Table 2 reports the first stage results (Equation 2) using various levels of control
variables: column (1) only included facility fixed effects, column (2) adds other control
variables, and column (3) is the full regression specification that includes other control variables,
fixed effects, and time trends. All three specifications find that higher unemployment rates
reduce nursing home turnover, with effect sizes ranging from a 1.0 to 2.4 percentage point
reduction in turnover for each one percentage point increase in the county unemployment rate.
The effects are all statistically significant at the 1 percent level and all specifications pass the
19

For easy visualization, Figure 1 plots the employment rate the opposite of the unemployment rate (i.e.,
100 – unemployment).
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Staiger-Stock criteria for a weak exclusion restriction by having an F-statistic over 10.
Additionally, all specifications pass the Stock-Yogo criteria by having a Cragg-Donaldson
statistic above the critical value of 8.96 assuming a 15 percent maximal IV size, and two of three
pass based on a 10 percent maximal IV size (critical value = 16.38).
The Effect of Nursing Turnover
Table 3 reports the regression results for Equation (1) for total deficiencies and number of
deficiencies by the three domains of quality of care, quality of life, and other deficiencies. The
model specifications include the use of pooled OLS, panel FE, and panel FE with IV. The first
three columns report models that do not include any additional control variables or time trends,
whereas columns (4)–(6) include additional controls but not time trends. The final three columns,
(7)–(9), are the full model specifications. For all coefficient estimates reported, the interpretation
is how the quality measure changes in response to a one percentage point change in the nurse
turnover rate.
The effect of turnover tends to follow a similar pattern across all model specifications and
for all four measures of deficiencies. Generally, the inclusion of FE reduce the effect size of
turnover relative to using pooled OLS, though both coefficient estimates are smaller than the
panel FE with IV estimation. This suggests that the simultaneity of turnover and quality is an
important component in modeling turnover, and that even including a FE underestimates the
negative impact of turnover. In addition to showing the bias from using only OLS or FE, the
table also shows the importance of controlling for other covariates. The inclusion of additional
control variables and time trends tends to increase the size of coefficient estimates.
In Panel A of Table 3, the results of the nine model specifications are reported using the
number of deficiencies as the dependent variable. Across all specifications the coefficient
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estimate for turnover is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. For the panel
FE with IV regression specification (columns 3, 6, and 9), a 10 percentage point increase in
turnover results in a facility receiving 0.6–2.2 more deficiencies, reflecting a 5.1–19.3 percent
increase in the number of deficiencies relative to the sample average. For the three domains
(Panels B–D), all specifications have effects in the same direction as the results for total number
of deficiencies, indicating that all aspects of nursing home quality improve with lower turnover.
While all domains of deficiencies improve, relative to the sample average, the magnitudes for the
quality of life and other deficiencies are significantly larger than for quality of care. For example,
a 10 percentage point increase in turnover results in 0.93 more quality of care, 0.79 quality of
life, and 0.41 more other deficiencies (column 9), but adjusting for the sample average, the
effects translate into increases of 13.5 percent, 23.1 percent, and 48.8 percent, respectively. 20
Table 4 reports the results for resident outcomes (Panels A–B) and care practice quality
measures (Panels C–D), as well mortality outcomes (Panel E–F). Similar to Table 3, the effect of
turnover tends to follow a similar pattern across all model specifications. One exception is that
when time trends are included, the effect sizes are similar but become statistically insignificant.
This is likely due to the time trend being highly correlated with the exclusion restriction and IV
being less efficient than pooled OLS or panel FE regression.
Panels A and B report the results for the resident outcomes measures of facility-acquired
bedsores and contracture respectively. For bedsores, all specifications indicate that higher
turnover decreases quality. For all the panel FE with IV regressions, a 10 percentage point
increase in turnover results in a 0.15–0.65 percentage point increase in the proportion of
20

These results are consistent with lower turnover spilling over to all aspects of quality in a nursing home.
For example, lower turnover allows nurses to create bonds with residents, potentially improving their quality of life
more than quality of care. It is also worth noting that most of the deficiencies classified as “other” are related to
administrative tasks. With lower turnover the experience of the average nurse increases, improving his or her
knowledge of what administrative tasks need to be performed.
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residents with bedsores. This effect size is quite large, reflecting a 6.1–26.5 percent increase
relative to the sample average. This result is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In
contrast, none of the results are statistically significant for contractures, and two model
specifications have negative coefficient estimates.
Panels C and D report the results for the care practice quality measures. For facilityacquired catheters and physical restraints, all but one of the model specifications show a positive
relationship between turnover and care practice and the majority of coefficient estimates are
statistically significant. This indicates that higher turnover leads to use of care practices
associated with poor quality. It should be noted that for both care practice measures, the panel FE
with IV models with full controls are statistically significant without time trends, but are not
statistically significant when time trends are included. Again, this is likely due to the high
correlation of the time trend with the exclusion restriction and inefficiency associated with IV.
The final two panels (E and F) report the mortality results. For both mortality measures
and across all specifications, the effect of turnover is positive, which is consistent with higher
turnover resulting in greater mortality among nursing home residents. For all panel FE with IV
models the effect of turnover is statistically significant for the discharge death rate (proportion of
discharges due to death), though in our preferred specification the result is only statistically
significant at the 10 percent level (column 9). In terms of effect size, a 10 percentage point
increase in turnover results in a 9.4 to 17.4 percent increase in the discharge death rate. In the
case of the census death rate (number of deaths divided by year-end census), we find that all
results are statistically significant except in the last two columns, which include our preferred
specification (column 9). For effect sizes, the census death rate increases 2.0 to 8.3 percent for
every 10 percentage point increase in turnover in the panel FE with IV models.

22

To put these results in the context of Stevens et al. (2015), who find that a 1 percentage
point increase in unemployment reduces the state-level mortality rate among nursing home
residents by 4.7 percent; a similar 1 percentage point increase in unemployment in our data
decreases turnover by 1.3–2.4 percentage points depending on the specification (as per Table 2).
If we extrapolate these changes in turnover to calculate the effect of turnover on mortality using
results from the panel FE with IV models (Table 4), we calculate a 0.9–3.8 percent reduction in
the discharge death rate and a 0.2–1.9 percent reduction in the census death rate.
Robustness Tests
To ensure that the results are robust to the empirical strategy employed, a series of
robustness tests are performed. The results of some of these robustness tests are reported in
Tables 5 and 6. In both tables, the baseline column (1) reports the coefficient estimates for the
impact of turnover as estimated by the panel FE with IV that includes full control variables and a
common quadratic time trend (i.e., column [9] of Table 3 or 4).
As noted in the results section, the statistical significance of some measures of quality is
sensitive to the definition of the time trend. Additionally, quality may be dynamic in nature, and
any persistence in quality may impact the results. To test the sensitivity to the definition of the
time trend, models were estimated that used a common linear trend (Table 5, column 2), a
county-specific linear trend, and a county-specific quadratic trend (column 3). To examine
whether the dynamic nature of nursing home quality created persistence in our outcomes that
may be correlated with turnover, we estimated models that a lagged measure of quality or
mortality (column 4). These alternative definitions of the time trends and included lagged
measures of quality or mortality found effect sizes for turnover consistent with those reported in
column (1).
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In our main specification, we used all nursing homes regardless of the number of times
they are observed in the data, but our results may be sensitive to missing data. First, OSCAR
surveys are performed every 9–15 months, and some nursing homes may be missing data for a
year because there were no OSCAR data available. Second, firms may not have data for all years
because the firm entered or exited the market during the study period. If nursing homes that enter
or exit the market are systematically different from those that are observed in all years, this could
potentially bias the results. Column (5) of Table 5 reports results based on a balanced panel—
that is, using only nursing homes that have data for all years. We find that the general
conclusions we can draw are similar to the baseline model, though some of the results become
insignificant. This is likely due to the sample size being over 44 percent smaller than the baseline
specification.
A third concern is that California started increasing reimbursement rates in 2005. To
account for these changes, column (6) of Table 5 includes the facility-specific reimbursement
rate as a control variable. 21 The coefficient estimate for turnover after accounting for
reimbursement rates is larger (0.284 vs. 0.221) for total number of deficiencies but not
statistically different from our main result. The other quality and mortality measures have similar
results to the baseline models.
Nurse staffing levels may be simultaneously determined with turnover, making the effect
of turnover sensitive to how nurse staffing levels are measured. Additionally, staffing levels are
highly correlated with the unemployment rate, and similar to the robustness checks related to
time trends, the inclusion of staffing levels that are highly correlated with the exclusion
restriction could impact the results. Finally, some nursing homes report staffing levels that are
21

Medicaid reimbursement rates are obtained from The Long-Term Care System Development Unit of the
Department of Health Care Services. The rates are available at http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/services/medical/Pages/AB1629/LTCAB1629.aspx. Reimbursement rates are not available for all facilities.
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clearly coding errors, and we flagged these nursing homes in our regressions with an indicator
for coding error. To test the sensitivity of our results to how staffing levels are specified we
estimate a series of alternative specifications. In Table 6, column (2), total nurse staffing HPRD
is utilized instead of staffing levels for each nurse type. In column (3), nurse staffing levels are
excluded as a control variable whereas in column (4) we estimated models that excluded
observations with staffing levels that are coding errors. All of these specifications report results
similar to the baseline model.
Finally, the main results reported in the paper use turnover for all nurses. The results
may be sensitive to the measure of turnover utilized. Columns (6) and (7) of Table 6 use the
other measures of turnover: CNA turnover and all employees turnover. These alternative
specifications are in line with the baseline models.

CONCLUSION
Nurse turnover has been cited as an important source of nursing home quality problems.
Several studies have asserted that nurse turnover in nursing homes are associated with lowquality care (Bostick et al. 2006; Castle and Engberg 2005; Collier and Harrington 2008),
although most studies find no statistically significant relationship and fail to account for the fact
that nursing turnover is endogenous. In this paper, we use IV estimation to address the
endogeneity of nurse turnover on mortality and quality of care. Specifically, we leverage the
deterioration in labor market conditions during the Great Recession when nursing turnover at
nursing homes in California declined by 17 percentage points. This decline was highly correlated
with the decrease in employment rate during the same period.
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Not accounting for endogeneity severely underestimates the impact of nurse turnover on
quality of care in nursing homes. Our main finding is that a 10 percentage point increase in
nursing turnover leads to an additional 2.2 deficiency citations to a nursing home per annual
survey. This represents a 19.3 percent increase in deficiency citations. Not accounting for
endogeneity suggests that nurse turnover leads to a 1 percent increase in citations. We also find
that higher turnover leads to worse quality of care in terms of bedsores and suggestive evidence
that other measures of quality are also worse, although the statistical significance of the effect for
other measures of quality is sensitive to the inclusion of time trends.
We find that mortality tends to improve as turnover is reduced. A 10 percentage point
increase in turnover results in a 9.4–17.4 percent increase in the discharge death rate and
increases the census death rate by 2.0 to 8.3 percent. While these results are statistically weak in
our preferred specifications—in particular, the census death rate results—the findings are
generally consistent with the procyclical nature of mortality suggested by Stevens et al. (2015),
who find that mortality among nursing home residents increased by 4.7 percent for each 1
percentage point increase in unemployment. We find results that are consistent, though smaller
than their finding. One reason for the divergence is that they use state-level age-adjusted
mortality rates, which are defined as the number of deaths in a nursing home, whereas we
examine the mortality in specific nursing homes. Second, in our data we are not able to
accurately calculate the denominator, as we do not know the number of residents that were in a
nursing homes during the course of the year. While this is a limitation of our study, our results
suggest that turnover is a potentially important mechanism that may explain the procyclical
nature of mortality. Further research is needed in order to more accurately measure mortality in
nursing homes, such as using the minimum data set.
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There have been efforts to reduce turnover, such as commitments by the American Health
Care Association and Ohio’s use of pay-for-performance based on keeping turnover below a
certain threshold. While these initiatives were promoted using studies based on association and
not causal effect, our finding that ignoring the endogeneity of turnover can severely
underestimate the impact of high turnover on reducing quality suggests that maybe even greater
emphasis on this nursing home quality issue is warranted. Efforts that improve pay relative to
outside options, improve working conditions and employee satisfaction, and reward nursing
homes that are able to retain good employees should be examined as possible public policy
responses.
The fact that turnover is lower during the Great Recession and that nursing home quality
improves with lower turnover points to nursing home quality being countercyclical. While
maintaining nursing home quality has always been a concern, the Great Recession has lowered
turnover in nursing homes, improving overall quality. As labor markets return to normal and
competition for workers increase, outside options will become more available, thus increasing
turnover in nursing homes.
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Figure 1 Turnover and Employment Trends
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Table 1 Summary Statistics of Selected Variables
Mean
53.01
52.67
49.01
11.46
6.86
3.42
0.84
2.46
1.11
6.30
7.58
2.43
3.32
8.56
37.27
16.15
0.04
0.00
0.54
12.83
68.13
9.65
5.15
103.62
88.27
47.03
10.94
40.86
23.73
2.34
0.07
0.34
0.76
2.32
613.90
10.59
12.32
5,992

Annual turnover-all nurse staff
Annual turnover-CNAs
Annual turnover-all employees
Quality - total number of deficiencies
Quality - Quality of care deficiencies
Quality - Quality of life deficiencies
Quality- Other deficiencies
Quality - % bedsores - facility acquired
Quality - % catheters - facility acquired
Quality - % physical restraints - facility acquired
Quality - % contractures - facility acquired
Mortality- Log death rate (discharges)
Mortality- Log death rate (census)
Annual county unemployment rate
Race: % minority
Ethnicity: % Hispanic
Non profit ownership
Government ownership
Facility part of chain
Payer mix: % Medicare
Payer mix: % Medicaid
Payer mix: % Self pay
Payer mix: % Managed care
Bed size
Occupancy rate
Discharges less than 1 month (%)
Case mix: Physical acuity level
Case mix: % Dementia
Case mix: % Psychiatric illness
Case mix: % Developmental disability
Case mix: Alzheimer special care unit
Staffing: RN hours per resident day
Staffing: LPN hours per resident day
Staffing: CNA hours per resident day
County-level HHI
Log per capita income
Log population 65+
Number of observations

Std Dev
32.07
34.75
27.43
6.84
4.20
2.68
0.99
3.40
3.05
8.60
12.74
0.80
0.83
3.71
25.74
14.81
0.21
0.06
0.50
10.69
21.38
12.39
8.26
48.61
9.33
19.53
2.02
20.48
21.64
5.37
0.26
0.27
0.43
0.82
1,248.69
0.24
1.36
5,992

Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
−1.78
−0.71
3.40
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
19
12.38
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
39.48
9.97
7.80
5,992

Max
412.50
354.17
233.33
51.00
32.00
21.00
9.00
78.02
87.80
94.62
89.74
4.61
6.48
29.90
100
96.81
1
1
1
92.14
100
87.77
99.54
391
162.67
100
21.86
100
100
83.08
1.00
3.65
3.94
6.20
10,000
11.44
13.91
5,992

SOURCE: Data are from 2005–2011 long-term care financial and utilization files collected by Office of Statewide Health
Planning and Development, the Online Survey, Certification and Reporting System (OSCAR) data set maintained by the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and Bureau of Labor Statistics.
NOTE: There are 980 unique facilities.
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Table 2 Select First Stage IV Results

Annual county unemployment rate
Facility fixed effects
Facility and county characteristics
Time trends
F statistics on exclusion restriction
Cragg-Donaldson Wald F statistic
Number of unique facilities
Number of observations

Model
1
–2.444
(0.134)
Yes
No
No
333.2
624.3
980
5,992

Model
2
–1.898
(0.170)
Yes
Yes
No
127.55
124.0
980
5,992

Model
3
–1.029
(0.288)
Yes
Yes
Yes
12.74
15.23
980
5,992

SOURCE: Data are from 2005–2011 long-term care financial and utilization files collected by Office
of Statewide Health Planning and Development, the Online Survey, Certification and Reporting
System (OSCAR) data set maintained by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),
and Bureau of Labor Statistics.
NOTE: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the
facility level.
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Table 3 Main Results-Effect of Nursing Turnover on Deficiencies
(1)
Pooled OLS
Panel A: Total Deficiencies
Annual turnover-all nurse staff
Mean Total Deficiencies

(4)
Pooled OLS

(5)
FE

(6)
IV FE

(7)
Pooled OLS

(8)
FE

(9)
IV FE

0.017*** 0.014*** 0.058***
(0.004)
(0.004) (0.011)

0.024***
(0.004)

0.012*** 0.082***
(0.004) (0.021)

0.022*** 0.012*** 0.221***
(0.004)
(0.004) (0.082)

0.011*** 0.010*** 0.044***
(0.002)
(0.002) (0.007)

0.015***
(0.002)

0.007*** 0.036***
(0.002) (0.013)

0.013*** 0.007*** 0.093**
(0.002)
(0.002) (0.044)

0.003**
(0.001)

0.010**
(0.004)

0.006***
(0.001)

0.003* 0.029***
(0.002) (0.009)

0.002*** 0.002*** 0.007***
(0.001)
(0.001) (0.002)

0.003***
(0.000)

0.002*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.003)

6.86

Panel C: Quality of Life
Annual turnover-all nurse staff
Mean Quality of Life

(3)
IV FE

11.46

Panel B: Quality of Care
Annual turnover-all nurse staff
Mean Quality of Care

(2)
FE

0.003*
(0.001)

0.005***
(0.001)

0.003*
(0.002)

0.079**
(0.032)

3.42

Panel D: Other
Annual turnover-all nurse staff
Mean Other
0.84
Facility fixed effects
Facility and county characteristics
Time trends
Number of observations

No
No
No
5,992

Yes
No
No
5,992

Yes
No
No
5,992

No
Yes
No
5,992

Yes
Yes
No
5,992

Yes
Yes
No
5,992

0.003*** 0.002*** 0.041***
(0.001)
(0.001) (0.015)
No
Yes
Yes
5,992

Yes
Yes
Yes
5,992

Yes
Yes
Yes
5,992

NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regression estimates are reported in the table with standard errors adjusted for clustering by facility in parentheses.
Facility and county characteristics include ownership status, facility size, chain membership, payer-mix, occupancy rates, proportion of minority and Hispanic
patients, discharges less than one month, log of county-level per capita income, log of population over 65, HH\I, and case-mix variables reported in Table 1. The
instrumental variables is county unemployment rate. There are 5,992 observations for 980 unique facilities.
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Table 4 Main Results-Effect of Nursing Turnover on Quality of Care and Mortality
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Pooled OLS
FE
IV FE Pooled OLS
Panel A: Facility-Acquired Bedsores
Annual turnover-all nurse staff
0.009*** 0.006*** 0.015** 0.008***
(0.002)
(0.002) (0.007)
(0.002)
Mean Facility-Acquired Bedsores
2.46
Panel B: Facility-Acquired Contractures
Annual turnover-all nurse staff
0.011
0.003
0.005
0.004
(0.007)
(0.007) (0.022)
(0.007)
Mean Facility-Acquired Contractures
7.58
Panel C: Facility-Acquired Catheter
Annual turnover-all nurse staff
0.004***
0.002 0.012** 0.003**
(0.001)
(0.002) (0.006)
(0.001)
Mean Facility-Acquired Catheter
1.11
Panel D: Facility-Acquired Restraints
Annual turnover-all nurse staff
0.029*** 0.027*** 0.226*** 0.019***
(0.005)
(0.005) (0.020)
(0.005)
Mean Facility-Acquired Restraints
6.3
Panel E: Log Death Rate(Discharge)
Annual turnover-all nurse staff
0.002*** 0.002*** 0.016***
0.001
(0.000)
(0.000) (0.001)
(0.000)
Mean Log Death Rate(discharge)
2.43
Panel F: Log Death Rate(Census)
Annual turnover-all nurse staff
0.002*** 0.001*** 0.008*** 0.001***
(0.001)
(0.000) (0.001)
(0.000)
Mean Log Death Rate(census)
3.32
Number of observations
5,992
5,992
5,992
5,992

(5)
FE

(6)
IV FE

0.005** 0.022
(0.002) (0.014)

(7)
Pooled OLS

(8)
FE

(9)
IV FE

0.008*** 0.005** 0.065*
(0.002)
(0.002) (0.035)

0.000 −0.084*
(0.007) (0.047)

0.006
(0.007)

0.002 −0.189
(0.007) (0.144)

0.002 0.030***
(0.002) (0.010)

0.003*
(0.001)

0.001 0.050
(0.002) (0.033)

0.002 0.083***
(0.005) (0.027)

0.010**
(0.005)

−0.000 0.130
(0.005) (0.087)

0.000 0.009***
(0.000) (0.002)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000 0.009*
(0.000) (0.005)

0.001** 0.006***
(0.000) (0.002)

0.001***
(0.000)

0.000 0.002
(0.000) (0.005)

5,992

5,992

5,992

5,992

5,992

NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regression estimates are reported in the table with standard errors adjusted for clustering by facility in parentheses.
Facility and county characteristics include ownership status, facility size, chain membership, payer-mix, occupancy rates, proportion of minority and Hispanic
patients, discharges less than one month, log of county-level per capita income, log of population over 65, HHI, and case-mix variables reported in Table 1. The
instrumental variables is county unemployment rate. There are 5,992 observations for 980 unique facilities.
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Table 5 Specification Checks
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)
Linear Quad County
Lagged
Baseline trend
trend
Dependent var
Panel A: Total Deficiencies
Annual turnover-all nurse staff

(5)
(6)
Balanced Medicaid
Panel
Rates

0.221*** 0.203**
(0.082) (0.079)

0.232**
(0.100)

0.176**
(0.076)

0.169** 0.284***
(0.086) (0.098)

0.065* 0.064*
(0.035) (0.034)

0.067
(0.046)

0.071*
(0.037)

0.066
(0.045)

0.058
(0.036)

Panel C: Facility Acquired Contractures
Annual turnover-all nurse staff
−0.189 −0.193
(0.144) (0.141)

−0.067
(0.142)

−0.169
(0.137)

−0.012
(0.158)

−0.175
(0.140)

0.050
0.049
(0.033) (0.032)

0.024
(0.040)

0.065*
(0.037)

0.093*
(0.054)

0.040
(0.033)

0.130
0.134
(0.087) (0.085)

0.242*
(0.123)

0.136
(0.094)

−0.020
(0.104)

0.161*
(0.093)

0.009* 0.009*
(0.005) (0.005)

0.010*
(0.006)

0.014**
(0.006)

0.005
(0.006)

0.012**
(0.005)

0.002
0.003
(0.005) (0.005)
5,992
5,992

0.007
(0.005)
5,992

0.007
(0.005)
5,953

0.000
(0.006)
3,390

0.004
(0.004)
5,646

Panel B: Facility Acquired Bedsores
Annual turnover-all nurse staff

Panel D: Facility Acquired Catheter
Annual turnover-all nurse staff

Panel E: Facility Acquired Restraints
Annual turnover-all nurse staff
Panel F: Log Death Rate (Discharges)
Annual turnover-all nurse staff

Panel F: Log Death Rate (Census)
Annual turnover-all nurse staff
Observations

NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regression estimates are reported in the table with standard errors adjusted for
clustering by facility in parentheses. Facility and county characteristics include ownership status, facility size, chain membership,
payer-mix, occupancy rates, proportion of minority and Hispanic patients, discharges less than one month, log of county-level per
capita income, log of population over 65, HHI, and case-mix variables reported in Table 1. The instrumental variables is county
unemployment rate.
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Table 6 Robustness Checks
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)
Total nurse No nurse Non-missing
Baseline staffing
staffing
staffing
Panel A: Total Deficiencies
Annual turnover-all nurse staff

0.221***
(0.082)

0.228***
(0.085)

0.227***
(0.086)

(5)
Nurse asst.
turnover

(6)
Total employee
turnover

0.224***
(0.086)

Annual turnover-CNAs

0.167***
(0.056)
0.300**
(0.122)

Panel B: Facility Acquired Bedsores
Annual turnover-all nurse staff

0.065*
(0.035)

0.067*
(0.036)

0.069*
(0.036)

0.065*
(0.037)

Annual turnover-CNAs

0.047*
(0.025)

Annual turnover-all employees
Panel C: Facility Acquired Contractures
Annual turnover-all nurse staff

0.088*
(0.050)
−0.189
(0.144)

−0.179
(0.145)

−0.190
(0.147)

−0.224
(0.156)

Annual turnover-CNAs

−0.138
(0.104)

Annual turnover-all employees
Panel D: Facility Acquired Catheter
Annual turnover-all nurse staff

0.050
(0.033)

0.051
(0.033)

0.050
(0.034)

0.042
(0.035)

Annual turnover-CNAs

0.037
(0.023)

Annual turnover-all employees
Panel E: Facility Acquired Restraints
Annual turnover-all nurse staff

0.067
(0.045)
0.130
(0.087)

0.135
(0.088)

0.134
(0.089)

0.146
(0.091)

Annual turnover-CNAs

0.096
(0.062)

Annual turnover-all employees
Panel F: Log Death Rate(discharges)
Annual turnover-all nurse staff

0.178
(0.120)
0.009*
(0.005)

0.009*
(0.005)

0.009*
(0.005)

0.009*
(0.005)

Annual turnover-CNAs
Annual turnover-all employees
Panel F: Log Death Rate(census)
Annual turnover-all nurse staff

−0.255
(0.199)

0.007*
(0.004)
0.013*
(0.008)
0.002
(0.005)

0.002
(0.005)

Annual turnover-CNAs

0.002
(0.005)

0.004
(0.005)
0.001
(0.004)

Annual turnover-all employees

0.003
(0.007)

Observations
5,992
5,992
5,992
5,173
5,967
5,991
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regression estimates are reported in the table with standard errors adjusted for
clustering by facility in parentheses. Facility and county characteristics include ownership status, facility size, chain membership,
payer-mix, occupancy rates, proportion of minority and Hispanic patients, discharges less than one month, log of county-level per
capita income, log of population over 65, HHI, and case-mix variables reported in Table 1. The instrumental variables is county
unemployment rate.
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Appendix Table 1: Effect of Unemployment Rate on Patient Characteristics
(1)
(2)
OLS
FE
Total admissions
–0.000
–0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
Log of total admissions

–0.001
(0.077)

0.069
(0.076)

Total discharges

–0.000
(0.000)

–0.000
(0.000)

Log of total discharges

–0.003
(0.077)

0.048
(0.077)

Case mix: Physical acuity level

–0.072*
(0.038)

0.040*
(0.024)

Case mix: % Dementia

–0.001
(0.003)

0.002
(0.002)

0.012***
(0.004)

0.001
(0.002)

0.009
(0.009)
No
No
5,992

0.013
(0.009)
Yes
Yes
5,992

Case mix: % Psychiatric illness

Case mix: % Developmental disability
Facility fixed effect
Linear time trend
Observations

NOTE: *** p< 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Regression estimates are reported in the table
with standard errors adjusted for clustering by facility in parentheses. Each column is a
separate regression.
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